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I. Introduction 
Scholars of U.S. bank regulation have long noted the growing 
significance of multilateral sources of rule-creation. U.S. adherence 
to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), includ-
ing banking services,1  and U.S. membership in the North American 
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 1 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND vol. 28 (1994), reprinted in 33 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 44 (1994) [herein-
after GATS].  On the significance of the GATS for bank regulation, see Chantal Thomas, 
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Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), which includes rules for trade 
in financial services within the region,2  will have obvious effects 
on financial services regulation as these two multilateral regimes 
continue to mature.  Of immediate interest, however, is the influ-
ence of the undertakings of the Bank for International Settlements 
(“BIS”), in which U.S. bank regulators have been participating di-
rectly.3  This article focuses primarily on the capital adequacy rules 
for internationally active banks developed by the BIS, popularly re-
ferred to as “Basel III,” which are intended to replace the capital 
adequacy guidelines in full operation from 1992.4  The BIS has al-
ready had an impact in terms of its active influence on specific man-
datory rules in banking regulation5  that for the present far exceeds 
that of the GATS and the NAFTA.6 
 
Globalization in Financial Services–What Role for GATS?, 21 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 323, 
331–33 (2002); Michael P. Malloy, International Financial Services: An Agenda for the 
Twenty-First Century, 15 TRANSNAT’L L. 55, 55–60 (2002) (discussing impact on U.S., 
foreign, and international baking); Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services Under 
GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 37, 52–57 (1996) (discussing goals of GATS and problems they were intended to help 
solve). 
 2 North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 
1992, reprinted in 32 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS. 289–397, 605–779 (entered into force Jan. 
1, 1994).  It should be noted that a new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“US-
MCA”) entered into force on July 1, 2020. On the significance of the NAFTA for bank 
regulation, see generally, Art Alcausin Hall, International Banking Regulation into the 
21st Century: Flirting with Revolution, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 41 (2001); 
Trachtman, supra note 1. The newly implemented USMCA had relatively little impact on 
trade in financial services. Much of the existing NAFTA framework applicable to financial 
services continues under the USMCA. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, INTERNATIONAL BANK-
ING 26–28 (4th ed. 2019) (discussing NAFTA and its transition to USMCA). 
 3 Basel Committee Membership, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (“BIS”), 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm [https://perma.cc/7YM5-9HBV] (last updated 
Dec. 30, 2016). 
 4 On the development of the original adequacy rules, see generally, Michael P. Mal-
loy, U.S. International Banking and the New Capital Adequacy Requirements: New, Old 
and Unexpected, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 75 (1988). 
 5 See, e.g., 3 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 15.02[C][1] 
(Wolters Kluwer 2d ed. 2011) (noting the “increasing significance” of the BIS Committee 
on Banking Supervision “as a forum or catalyst for international monetary cooperation and 
policy development”). 
 6 One reason for the relative influence of the BIS may be that the impact of other 
multilateral regimes has been blunted by specialized rules and exceptions that limit their 
binding effect on bank regulatory practices of national regulators. See, e.g., Michael P. 
Malloy, Financial Services Regulation After NAFTA, in THE FIRST DECADE OF NAFTA: 
THE FUTURE OF FREE TRADE IN NORTH AMERICA (Kevin Kennedy ed., 2004) (arguing that 
2021 EMERGING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 441 
A. Themes 
The theme of this article is two-fold.  First, given the current 
significance of the work of the BIS for rule-creation in national bank 
regulatory systems, it is important to analyze and assess the capital 
adequacy accord on its own terms.  Second, with the example of the 
capital adequacy rules in mind, the article will suggest that the work 
of the BIS represents an emerging source of international law appli-
cable to financial services providers operating in international mar-
kets. 
B. The Bank for International Settlements 
The BIS, located in Basel, Switzerland, is a multilateral bank for 
national central banks.7  Traditionally, it has been primarily sup-
ported by the “Group of Ten” large industrialized democracies (“G-
10”), consisting of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Ja-
pan, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United 
States, with Switzerland as an additional significant participant.8  
The BIS assists central banks in the transfer and investment of mon-
etary reserves and often plays a role in settling international loan 
arrangements.9  Of increasing significance is its role as a forum or 
catalyst for international monetary cooperation and regulatory pol-
icy development.10 
The failure of Herstatt Bank in Germany and Franklin National 
Bank in New York in 1974, with financial repercussions throughout 
the increasingly “internationalized” banking market, led the G-10 to 
sponsor an informal understanding on the resolution of international 
bank failures, known as the Basel Concordat, which was finalized 
in 1975.11  The Governors of the BIS acknowledged the need to 
 
“the practical effects of [NAFTA] obligations are likely to emerge only incrementally, and 
those effects will have an impact largely cushioned by the intervention of reasonable 
measures domestically imposed for prudential reasons”). 
 7 For extended discussion of the BIS, see MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK 
REGULATION §§ 9.7-9.9 (3d ed. 2011). 
 8 History – Overview, BIS, https://www.bis.org/about/history.htm [https://perma. 
cc/88E8-CAS2] (last visited Dec. 18, 2020). 
 9 See id. (discussing roles of BIS). 
 10 Id. 
 11 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING REGS. & SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, REPORT TO THE 
GOVERNORS ON THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS (1975), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs00a.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN6S-3CWC] [hereinafter CON-
CORDAT]. 
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establish a framework of multilateral bank supervision, and formed 
the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, 
now known as Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Com-
mittee).12  The Committee originally consisted of foreign exchange 
and supervisory officials from the G-10, but over the course of al-
most 50 years it has expanded to 45 officials of institutions from 28 
jurisdictions.13 
The Committee promotes cooperation among national regula-
tors—it facilitates the establishment of broadly delineated princi-
ples to guide the differing national supervisory systems in establish-
ing their own detailed arrangements.14  This was the approach taken 
by the 1975 Concordat in establishing a set of broad principles for 
the resolution of future bank crises.15  The generality of the guiding 
principles articulated in the Concordat proved to be insufficient 
when Banco Ambrosiano, based in Italy with a subsidiary in Lux-
embourg, failed in 1982.16  Italian authorities at first indicated that, 
from their perspective as “lender of last resort” to the bank, they 
would honor only Ambrosiano’s domestic (i.e., Italian) obliga-
tions.17  This unexpected gap in banking supervision caused great 
distress in the banking world,18  even though a large group of cred-
itor banks of the Luxembourg subsidiary did eventually reach a set-
tlement with the Italian central bank involving more than $300 mil-
lion in subsidiary obligations.19  One result of the difficulties of 
 
 12 History of the Basel Committee, BIS, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GC5M-MHBE] (last visited Dec. 18, 2020). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See generally CONCORDAT, supra note 11. 
 16 See, e.g., Ethan B. Kapstein, Architects of Stability? International Cooperation 
Among Financial Supervisors 7 (BIS, Working Paper No. 199, Feb. 26, 2006) (“The col-
lapse of Banco Ambrosiano - the ‘Pope’s bank’ - in 1982 had painfully demonstrated the 
many holes that remained in this nascent supervisory architecture. Who was responsible 
for providing the lender of last resort function when the subsidiary of a bank collapsed? 
Was it the home or the host authority? What information were home and host supervisors 
expected to share across borders; indeed, what were they permitted by law to share?”). 
 17 For a useful analysis of the Banco Ambrosiano collapse and its implications for 
regulatory policy, see Ulrich Hess, The Banco Ambrosiano Collapse and the Luxury of 
National Lenders of Last Resort with International Responsibilities, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 181, 199–03 (1990) (describing how the banking crisis revealed a number of loop-
holes and issues with the existing regulatory scheme). 
 18 Id. at 189–90. 
 19 Id. 
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resolving this multinational bank failure was the revision of the 
Concordat in 1983.20  The revision articulated in relatively greater 
detail supervisory responsibilities with respect to multinational 
banking enterprises.21 
Since the issuance of the Basel Concordat, the Committee has 
given further attention to the problems of supervising transnational 
banking enterprises.  An April 1990 Supplement to the Concordat 
sought to strengthen the principle of effective information flow be-
tween home-country and host-country authorities22  by making the 
rules on information transfer more explicit and detailed. 
The 1991 scandal surrounding the collapse of the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (“BCCI”)23  subsequently caused the 
BIS Committee to review the arrangements for coordination of in-
ternational bank supervision, which had proved inadequate in the 
events surrounding the BCCI collapse.24  Hence, in June 1992, the 
Committee took the further significant step of issuing a report es-
tablishing minimum standards on the supervision of international 
banking enterprises.25  While the standards were not, on their own 
terms, binding on states, BIS participating states were expected to 
implement them, and other states were encouraged to do the same.26  
In the United States, implementation occurred primarily in 
 
 20 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION (“BCBS”), PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVI-
SION OF BANKS’ FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS (1983), https://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbsc312.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJY5-2T7J] [hereinafter PRINCIPLES FOR SUPERVISION]. 
 21 See Duncan E. Alford, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision: An En-
forceable International Financial Standard?, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 237, 248 
(2005) (explaining that “with the Revised Concordat, the Committee attempted to close 
the supervisory gaps that existed under the original Concordat and directly address the 
adequacy of foreign bank regulation”). 
 22 BCBS, INFORMATION FLOWS BETWEEN BANKING SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES (SUP-
PLEMENT TO THE CONCORDANT) (1990), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc313.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GHD8-FYH9], reprinted in MALLOY, supra note 2, at 73–76. 
 23 For a review of the BCCI scandal and the legislative reaction to the scandal in the 
United States, see RAJ K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFTER BCCI (Carolina Ac-
ademic Press 1994). 
 24 See Alford, supra note 21, at 251–55 (discussing weaknesses of revised Concordat 
in relation to BCCI failure). 
 25 BCBS, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 
GROUPS AND THEIR CROSS–BORDER ESTABLISHMENT (1992), https://www.bis.org/ 
publ/bcbsc314.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K7A-VQ94], reprinted in MALLOY, supra note 2, at 
76–80 [hereinafter MINIMUM STANDARDS]. 
 26 Id. at 77–78. 
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connection with the enactment of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvements Act.27 
More recently, the Committee, in conjunction with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, developed a set of core principles for effective 
banking supervision.28  The original Core Principles consisted of 
twenty-five basic principles, ranging from preconditions for effec-
tive banking supervision (Principle 1) to principles for cross-border 
banking (Principles 23–25).29  Significantly, the principles address 
in detail prudential regulations and requirements (Principles 6-15), 
which have the effect of requiring careful supervision of manage-
ment operations and internal controls.30 
In April 2006, the Committee issued a proposed revision of the 
Core Principles, which was issued in final form in October 2006.31  
The basic focus remained the same as in the original version, but a 
new “umbrella principle” advised banks to establish integrated risk 
management systems across the range of different risks banks face 
(Principle 7).32  Criteria for evaluating liquidity (Principle 14), op-
erational (Principle 15), and interest rate risks (Principle 16) were 
also enhanced,33  and criteria with respect to money laundering, 
 
 27 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(A) (2018) (requiring approval of U.S. branch of 
foreign bank and comprehensive supervision of applicant on consolidated basis by home 
state authorities); § 3105(d)(3)(A) (requiring the same: consent of home state to establish-
ment of U.S. branch as standard of approval by U.S. authorities); § 3105(e)(1)(A) (requir-
ing termination of U.S. office of foreign bank when foreign bank not subject to compre-
hensive supervision on consolidated basis by home state authorities). 
 28 BCBS, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION (1997), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ5X-28UZ], reprinted in 37 
INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 405 (1998) [hereinafter CORE PRINCIPLES 1997]. The principles 
were, of course, not binding in themselves, but “serve[d] as a basic reference for supervi-
sory and other public authorities in all countries and internationally.” Id. at 407. 
 29 Id. at 408, 410. 
 30 Id. at 408–09. 
 31 See generally BCBS, CORE PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY (2006), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs130.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN62-RAHB] [hereinafter CORE 
PRINCIPLES 2006]; BCBS, COMPARISON BETWEEN THE 1999 AND 2006 VERSIONS OF THE 
CORE PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY (2006), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcpmastermap-
ping.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SMA-9MBE]; Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Issues Revised 
Supervisory Principles for Comment, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 10, 2006) (available by sub-
scription at https://news.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/UEV7-RQCC]) (discussing 
proposed revision). 
 32 CORE PRINCIPLES 2006, supra note 31, at 15–17. 
 33 Id. at 23–27. 
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terrorist financing, and fraud prevention (Principle 18) were 
strengthened.34  Bank supervisors from central banks and supervi-
sory agencies in 120 countries endorsed the updated version of the 
Basel Core Principles.35 
In September 2012, the Committee published the current ver-
sion of the revised Core Principles36  intended—in the wake of the 
2008 financial crisis37—to ensure effective national regulation and 
supervision of banks and banking systems under individual national 
jurisdictions.  As of mid-September 2012, the revised Core Princi-
ples was endorsed by global banking supervisors and central bank-
ers from more than 100 countries.38 
C. Capital Adequacy 
The BIS was also responsible for what is perhaps the most in-
fluential contemporary development in the international supervision 
of banking—the formulation of uniform guidelines governing the 
measurement and enforcement of capital adequacy of banks.39  In 
U.S. practice, capital adequacy requirements predate the BIS ef-
forts.40  However, the rules developed under BIS auspices were 
aimed not only at a capital adequacy regime that would be effective 
as a purely regulatory matter, but also one that would encourage a 
 
 34 Id. at 29–31 (addressing “abuse of financial services”). 
 35 Press Release, BCBS, Bank Supervisors from 120 Countries Endorse Updated In-
ternational Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Oct. 5, 2006), 
https://www.bis.org/press/p061005a.htm [https://perma.cc/AA98-PRU8]. 
 36 CORE PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 28; see Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Issues 
Final Version of Revised Core Principles on Supervision, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 17, 2012) 
(available by subscription at https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ [https://perma.cc/5TKL-
P78Y]) (discussing significance of revised Core Principles). 
 37 For discussion of the 2008 crisis, see 2 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND 
REGULATION § 6.02[E] (Wolters Kluwer 2d ed. 2011). See generally MICHAEL P. MALLOY, 
ANATOMY OF A MELTDOWN (Aspen Publishers 2010) (providing analysis and explanation 
of subprime mortgage market collapse). 
 38 Pruzin, supra note 36. 
 39 See generally BCBS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT 
AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DD9B-W6Q7], reprinted in 4 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) ¶¶ 47–105 
(Nov. 6, 1991) [hereinafter CAPITAL STANDARDS]. For discussion of the BIS capital ade-
quacy rules and their implementation in U.S. law, see MALLOY, supra note 7, § 7.8. 
 40 See Malloy, supra note 4, at 75–76, 81–87 (discussing pre-BIS regulatory prac-
tice). 
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multilateral convergence of regulatory standards.41  What is signif-
icant in the present context, however, is that the U.S. regulators 
chose to apply this multilateral regime not just to internationally ac-
tive banks (as contemplated by the BIS capital guidelines), but to all 
banks subject to federal regulation.42 
The guidelines set forth “the details of the agreed framework for 
measuring capital adequacy and the minimum standard to be 
achieved which the national supervisory authorities represented on 
the Committee intend to implement in their respective countries.”43  
The basic focus of this multilateral framework was “assessing cap-
ital in relation to credit risk (the risk of counterparty failure).”44  
However, the framework acknowledged that “other risks, notably 
interest rate risk and the investment risk on securities, need[ed] to 
be taken into account by supervisors in assessing overall capital ad-
equacy.”45  The framework consisted of a minimum required ratio 
of certain specified constituents of capital to risk-weighted assets.46  
In this context, “capital” has two types of constituents: “core capi-
tal”47  and “supplementary capital.”48  Core capital, the so-called 
“Tier 1” of capital elements, consists of: (i) equity capital49  and (ii) 
 
 41 About BIS - Overview, BIS, https://www.bis.org/about/index.htm?m=1%7C1 
[https://perma.cc/MJ28-7DTW] (last visited Dec. 18, 2020) (identifying the BIS institu-
tional mission as “to serve central banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial stability, 
to foster international cooperation in those areas and to act as a bank for central banks”) 
(emphasis added). 
 42 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, App. A, § 1(b)(2) (2020) (explaining that Comptroller’s risk-
based capital guidelines “apply to all national banks”); id. pt. 208, App. A, § I (applying 
Federal Reserve’s risk-based capital guidelines “to all state member banks on a consoli-
dated basis”); id. pt. 325, App. A (applying FDIC’s risk-based capital maintenance rules 
“to all FDIC-insured state-chartered banks . . . that are not members of the Federal Reserve 
System . . . regardless of size”). 
 43 CAPITAL STANDARDS, supra note 39, at 1.  
 44 Id. at 2. 
 45 Id. 
 46 For detailed discussion of the minimum required ratio and its calculation, see Mal-
loy, supra note 4, at 84–87. 
 47 See CAPITAL STANDARDS, supra note 39, at 3-4 (discussing meaning of “core cap-
ital”); id. at 17, Annex 1 (defining capital in terms of capital base after transitional period). 
 48 See id. at 4-7 (discussing meaning of “supplementary capital”); id. at 17, Annex 1 
(defining capital in terms of capital base after transitional period). 
 49 For these purposes, “equity capital” is defined as “[i]ssued and fully paid ordinary 
shares/common stock and non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock (but excluding cumu-
lative preferred stock).”  Id. at 3; see also id. at 18 § D(i) (defining “Tier 1” capital ele-
ments).  In the case of consolidated accounts, Tier 1 capital would also include minority 
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disclosed reserves from post-tax earnings.50 
The eligible constituents of Tier 1 and supplementary capital 
(the so-called “Tier 2” capital) are subject to certain deductions un-
der the framework.51  The amount of goodwill must be deducted 
from the figure for Tier 1 capital.52  The amount of investments in 
unconsolidated banking and financial subsidiaries, if any,53  must be 
deducted from the total capital base.54  The Committee considered, 
but ultimately rejected, requiring deduction of banks’ holdings of 
capital issued by other banks or depository institutions.55  Neverthe-
less, the framework does reflect the agreement that individual su-
pervisory authorities retain the discretion to require such deduc-
tions.56  If no deduction is applied, such holdings are required to 
bear an asset risk weight of 100 percent for purposes of assessing 
capital adequacy of the holding bank.57 
The framework endorsed a risk-weighted approach to the assets 
denominator of the capital-assets ratio.58  The framework estab-
lished a relatively simple methodology for risk-weighting, with only 
five risk weights being employed.59  Essentially, the methodology 
 
interests in the equity of subsidiaries of the bank that are less than wholly owned.  Id. 
 50 Id. at 3-4.  For these purposes, disclosed reserves are reserves that are “created or 
increased by appropriations of retained earnings or other surplus, e.g. share premiums, 
retained profit, general reserves and legal reserves.”  Id. at 18.  Tier 1 does not include 
revaluation reserves.  Id. 
 51 See id. at 7. 
 52 Id. 
 53 The framework generally assumes as the normal practice that subsidiaries will be 
consolidated for the purpose of assessing capital adequacy, but “[w]here this is not done, 
deduction is essential to prevent multiple use of the same capital resources in different 
parts of [a banking] group.”  CAPITAL STANDARDS, supra note 39, at 7. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 Conceivably, these discretionary policies may require deduction of the amount of 
all such holdings, holdings to the extent that they exceed some determined limit in relation 
to the holding bank’s or the issuing bank’s capital, or on a case-by-case basis.  The frame-
work also reflected the agreement that, “in applying these policies, member countries 
[should] consider that reciprocal cross-holdings of bank capital designed artificially to in-
flate the capital position of the banks concerned should not be permitted.”  Id. 
 57 Id. at 8. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See CAPITAL STANDARDS, supra note 39, at 21-22 (establishing risk weights by 
categories of on-balance-sheet asset). 
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effectively captured only credit risk.60  It was left to the discretion 
of individual supervisory authorities to decide whether to attempt to 
account for more methodologically difficult types of risk, such as 
investment risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk or concentra-
tion risk.61  Furthermore, the individual supervisory authorities also 
retained discretion to supplement the framework’s risk-weighted 
methodology with “other methods of capital measurement,”62  such 
as the mandated capital-assets ratios previously established by indi-
vidual national regulators.  To account for country transfer risk, the 
Committee adopted an approach that applied differing risk weights 
to defined groups of countries.63 
The framework also recognized the importance of bringing off-
 
 60 Id. at 8. 
 61 Id. at 8-9. 
 62 Id. at 8. 
 63 Id. at 10. 
[T]he Committee has concluded that a defined group of countries should be 
adopted as the basis for applying differential weighting coefficients[.]  The 
framework also recognizes the importance of and that this group should be 
full members of the OECD or countries which have concluded special ar-
rangements with the [International Monetary Fund] associated with the 
Fund’s General Arrangements to Borrow . . . . 
. . .  This decision has the following consequences for the weighting structure.  
Claims on central governments within the OECD will attract a zero weight 
(or a low weight if the national supervisory authority elects to incorporate 
interest rate risk); and claims on OECD non-central government public-sec-
tor entities will attract a low weight . . . .   Claims on central governments and 
central banks outside the OECD will also attract a zero weight (or a low 
weight if the national supervisory authority elects to incorporate investment 
risk), provided such claims are denominated in the national currency and 
funded by liabilities in the same currency . . . . 
. . .   As regards the treatment of interbank claims, in order to preserve the 
efficiency and liquidity of the international interbank market[,] there will be 
no differentiation between short- term claims on banks incorporated within 
or outside the OECD.  However, the Committee draws a distinction be-
tween . . . short-term placements with other banks . . . and . . . longer-term 
cross-border loans to banks which are often associated with particular trans-
actions and carry greater transfer and/or credit risks.  A 20 per cent [sic] 
weight will therefore be applied to claims on all banks, wherever incorpo-
rated, with a residual maturity of up to an[d] including one year; longer-term 
claims on OECD incorporated banks will be weighted at 20 per cent [sic]; 
and longer-term claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD will be 
weighted at 100 percent. 
Id. 
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balance-sheet risk into the analysis of capital adequacy.64  All cate-
gories of off-balance-sheet risk were brought within the framework, 
by conversion into appropriate credit risk equivalents.65 
Uncertainty remained about the appropriate approach to items 
exposed to significant interest-rate and exchange-rate related risk, 
such as swaps, options and futures.66  As to these contingencies, the 
framework took the position that special treatment was necessary, 
“because banks are not exposed to credit risk for the full face value 
of their contracts, but only to the cost of replacing the cash flow if 
the counterparty defaults.”67 
Once the credit equivalent amounts of such contingencies have 
been calculated, the amounts are to be weighted in accordance with 
the risk weights applicable to the category of counterparties in-
volved.68  However, in anticipation of the fact that most counterpar-
ties in the market for such contingencies, particularly long-term 
contracts, “tend to be first-class names,”69  the Final Report reflected 
general agreement that such contingencies would be assigned a 50 
percent risk weight, rather than the 100 percent risk weight that 
might otherwise be applicable.70 
The final element in the risk-weighted methodology, as with any 
capital-assets ratio requirement, is the required minimum level of 
the ratio.71  As the proposed version of this multilateral agreement 
was taking shape, it was generally agreed that specifying a target 
ratio was desirable before the proposed framework was circulated 
at the national level for consultation and discussion.72  After further 
consultations and study of the proposed version, the final agreement 
was reached and the framework adopted a target standard ratio of 
eight percent, of which core capital must constitute at least four 
 
 64 See id. at 12-13 (discussing treatment of off-balance-sheet engagements). 
 65 CAPITAL STANDARDS, supra note 39, at 23-24, 51 (establishing credit conversion 
factors for off-balance-sheet items). 
 66 See id. at 13. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 27. 
 70 Id. However, some member countries have apparently reserved the right to apply 
the full 100 percent risk weight. See id. at 27 n. 9. 
 71 CAPITAL STANDARDS, supra note 39, at 28. 
 72 See id. at 14.  
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percent.73  This target ratio became fully applicable at year-end 
1992.74 
The Basel Committee has continued to refine the details and me-
chanics of risk management and supervision.75  Correspondingly, 
implementation of the guidelines in the United States has not been 
a static project; the guidelines have been the subject of continuous 
reassessment and refinement by the regulators.76  By the mid-1990s, 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See, e.g., BCBS, BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD: THE TREATMENT OF THE CREDIT RISK 
ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS (1994), https://www.bis.org/ 
publ/bcbs12a.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DDW-PE6W]; BCBS, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDE-
LINES FOR DERIVATIVES (1994), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc211.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7RMV-D7AR]; BCBS, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD OF JULY 1988 
(1994), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs12b.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GYC-4WH7]; BCBS, 
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES (1994), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs14.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT79-PJU2]; BCBS, BASEL CAPI-
TAL ACCORD: TREATMENT OF POTENTIAL EXPOSURE FOR OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS 
(1995), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs18.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WTT-H2U7]; BCBS, AN 
INTERNAL MODEL-BASED APPROACH TO MARKET RISK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (1995), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LR9-56P2]; BCBS, PUBLIC DIS-
CLOSURE OF THE TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS AND SECURITIES FIRMS 
(1995), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs21.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7Y2-NHR4]; BCBS, SU-
PERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF ‘BACKTESTING’ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE INTER-
NAL MODELS APPROACH TO MARKET RISK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (1996), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs22.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RRX-NHBE]; BCBS, AMEND-
MENT TO THE BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS (1996), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K2P-X4RR]; BCBS, INTERPRE-
TATION OF THE CAPITAL ACCORD FOR THE MULTILATERAL NETTING OF FORWARD VALUE 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS (1996), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs25.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4JBC-B8QS]; BCBS, PRINCIPLES FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVI-
SION OF INTEREST RATE RISK (2001), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca09.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5GSZ-H8YZ].  The Basel Committee asked for comment by October 31, 
2003, on revised interest rate risk principles as part of its larger work on developing new 
international bank capital standards, and made subsequent changes in 2004 and again in 
2016.  Basel Committee Asks for Comment on Revised Interest Rate Risk Principles, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 8, 2003) (available by subscription at https://www.bloomber-
glaw.com [https://perma.cc/HT6Y-K2BG]); BCBS, PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGEMENT AND 
SUPERVISION OF INTEREST RATE RISK (2003), https://www. 
bis.org/publ/bcbs102.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ7R-X3VQ] (providing a revised consulta-
tive paper and a summary explanation concerning the proposal); BCBS, PRINCIPLES FOR 
MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF INTEREST RATE RISK (2004), https://www. 
bis.org/publ/bcbs108.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV8B-N5DH] (providing the 2004 Principles); 
BCBS, PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF INTEREST RATE RISK (2016), 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d368.htm [https://perma.cc/X7XD-GNBX] (providing the 
2016 version).  
 76 See, e.g., Risk-Based Capital Standards, 62 Fed. Reg. 55686 (Oct. 27, 1997) 
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the agencies were seriously focusing upon management of interest-
rate risk, which was not within the purview of the original guide-
lines.77  Similarly, the regulators have folded market-risk provisions 
into the framework of the guidelines.78 
II. Major Revisions of the Capital Accord 
A. Basel II 
The capital adequacy methodology exhibited some serious 
shortcomings.  First, the framework primarily recognized only a 
narrow, though very significant, type of risk—credit risk, i.e., the 
 
(proposing uniform treatment of certain construction and real estate loans and investments 
in mutual funds; simplifying Tier 1 capital standards); Risk-Based Capital Standards, 62 
Fed. Reg. 55692 (Oct. 27, 1997) (proposing similar amendments with respect to treatment 
of capital of bank holding companies); Risk-Based Capital Standards; Recourse and Direct 
Credit Substitutes, 62 Fed. Reg. 59944 (Nov. 5, 1997) (proposing regulatory capital treat-
ment of recourse obligations and direct credit substitutes); Risk-Based Capital Standards, 
64 Fed. Reg. 10194 (Mar. 2, 1999) (providing OCC, Fed, FDIC and OTS rules for con-
struction loans on presold residential properties, junior liens on one- to four-family resi-
dential properties, investments in mutual funds, and tier 1 leverage ratio); Risk-Based Cap-
ital Standards, 64 Fed. Reg. 10201 (Mar. 2, 1999) (corresponding Fed rule applicable to 
bank holding companies); Risk-Based Capital Standards; Recourse and Direct Credit Sub-
stitutes, 65 Fed. Reg. 12320 (Mar. 8, 2000) (proposing changes in risk-based capital stand-
ards to address recourse obligations and direct credit substitutes); Bank Holding Compa-
nies and Changes in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16480 (Mar. 28, 2000) proposing regula-
tory capital treatment of certain investments in nonfinancial companies by bank holding 
companies); Risk-Based Capital Standards: Claims on Securities Firms, 67 Fed. Reg. 
16971 (Apr. 9, 2002) (reducing risk weight applicable to claims on, and claims guaranteed 
by, qualifying U.S. securities firms and securities firms incorporated in OECD member 
countries from 100 percent to twenty percent; conforming FDIC and OTS rules to existing 
OCC and Fed to permit zero percent risk weight for certain claims on qualifying securities 
firms collateralized by cash on deposit in lending institution or by securities issued or 
guaranteed by the United States or other OECD central governments); Risk-Based Capital 
Guidelines, 68 Fed. Reg. 56530 (Oct. 1, 2003) (issuing interim final rule to remove con-
solidated asset-backed commercial paper program assets from risk-weighted asset bases 
for purpose of calculating risk-based capital ratios). 
 77 See, e.g., Joint Agency Policy Statement: Interest Rate Risk, 61 Fed. Reg. 33,166 
(June 26, 1996) (publishing OCC, FRS & FDIC joint policy statement providing guidance 
on sound practices for managing interest rate risk). But see Capital: Qualifying Mortgage 
Loan, Interest Rate Risk Component, and Miscellaneous Changes, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,722 
(May 10, 2002) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 516.40(a)(2), 567.1, 567.5(b)(4), 
567.6(a)(1)(iv)(G)-(H); removing § 567.7) (imposing 50 percent risk weight for certain 
qualifying mortgage loans; eliminating interest rate risk component of risk-based capital 
regulations; making technical amendments). 
 78 See, e.g., Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 62 Fed. Reg. 68064 (Dec. 
30, 1997) (amending market risk provisions in risk-based capital standards). 
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risk of counterparty failure.79  Over time, the methodology was re-
fined to fold in interest-rate risks and exchange-rate risk.80  How-
ever, the methodology still did not include any adjustment for inter-
nal or “operational” risk.81  This type of risk focuses on a bank’s 
vulnerability to poor management of asset risks, which is of course 
very important for safety and soundness purposes.82 
Second, the methodology for risk-weighting was technically ru-
dimentary.  Five basic risk weights—0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 percent 
of asset value—were available for all types of assets and all types 
of counterparties.83  This arrangement produced such anomalous re-
sults since it applied the same risk weight to a commercial loan to a 
small business operating a local retail computer store and a com-
mercial loan to a major dot.com corporation, despite the obvious 
differences in the relative risks involved in the two borrowers. 
Third, the framework did not take into account the dramatic 
changes in the contours of the banking market itself.  These changes 
included consolidation in holding company patterns of ownership 
and control of increasingly diversified financial services 
 
 79 For extensive discussion of the types of risk relevant to the conduct of the business 
of banking, see BCBS, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION, § IV.A 
(2012), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ3J-NSGL]. 
 80 See, e.g., id. (citing revisions in methodology to account for interest rate and ex-
change rate risks). 
 81 The term operational risk may be defined as “the risk of direct or indirect loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external 
events.”  BCBS, THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 118 n. 62 (2001), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca03.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U47-ZFTG] [hereinafter AC-
CORD].  As used in the BIS proposed Accord, the term does not include strategic and rep-
utational risk.  Id.  For discussion of reputational risk, see CORE PRINCIPLES 1997, supra 
note 28, at 22. A working paper of the BIS Committee’s Risk Management Group has 
proposed the deletion of the phrase “direct or indirect” from the definition of operational 
loss, because it was too vague. BCBS, WORKING PAPER ON THE REGULATORY TREATMENT 
OF OPERATIONAL RISK 2 (2001), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U5DQ-MHAN] [hereinafter RMG WORKING PAPER]. In June 2002, the 
Basel Committee announced that it would be seeking detailed information from interna-
tionally active banks with respect to operational risk exposures for 2001.  Daniel Pruzin, 
Basel Committee Seeks More Bank Data on Operational Risk Exposures for FY 2001, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 7, 2002) (available by subscription at  https://www.bloomber-
glaw.com/ [https://perma.cc/KX5G-48AH]). 
 82 Cf. Internal Ratings-Based Systems for Corporate Credit and Operational Risk Ad-
vanced Measurement Approaches for Regulatory Capital, 68 Fed. Reg. 45, 949 (Aug. 4, 
2003) (discussing the significance of operational risk). 
 83 Malloy, supra note 4, at 95. 
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enterprises.84  Consolidation and diversification took place in a 
markedly more globalized market environment.85 
Fourth, the methodology tended to be insensitive to the individ-
ual experience and operational qualities of banks.  The framework 
had one size to fit all banks subject to capital adequacy require-
ments.86  Thus, greater reliance on standardized capital adequacy 
calculations—a tendency clearly exhibited by U.S. statutes—car-
ried with it the danger that there would be less emphasis on individ-
ualized safety-and-soundness assessment of particular banks.87 
Over the past two decades, the BIS Committee began working 
on amendments to the 1988 Guidelines in order to account for new 
globalized financial practices and to create a more flexible, risk-
sensitive framework for determining minimum capital require-
ments.88  In June 1999, the BIS issued a proposal that would signif-
icantly revise the capital adequacy accord, in two basic ways: by 
extensively refining the 1988 guidelines, and by providing a dra-
matic alternative approach.89  The new approach had three basic 
principles: (i) international banks would be required to establish 
their own internal methods for assessing the relative risks of their 
assets, (ii) supervisory authorities would be expected to exercise 
greater oversight of these capital assessments, and (iii) greater trans-
parency in banking operations would be required, e.g., the credit-
worthiness of borrowing governments and corporations would be 
assessed by credit-rating agencies, and these ratings would be used 
by banks in pricing loans to such borrowers.90  Financial institutions 
 
 84 MALLOY, supra note 7, § 6.1. 
 85 Id. § 9.2. 
 86 This was particularly true of the U.S. application of the BIS framework.  While 
the framework by its own terms applied only to international banks, U.S. statutes and im-
plementing regulations applied the capital adequacy regime to all banks subject to federal 
regulation. See text and accompanying note, supra note 53 (discussing scope of U.S. cap-
ital adequacy rules). 
 87 Cf., e.g., MALLOY, supra note 7, § 7.10 (questioning whether capital supervision 
is an appropriate way to monitor safety and soundness). 
 88 See Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Sets Out Changes to Risk Calculations Under 
Capital Accord, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 3, 2001) (available by subscription at  
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/B6EZ-3UR4]) (discussing BIS motiva-
tions for proposed Capital Accord); see also MALLOY, supra note 7 (citing BIS issuances 
concerning refinement of capital adequacy framework). 
 89 See, e.g., Alan Cowell, An International Banking Panel Proposes Ways to Limit 
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at C4, col. 2 (describing proposed revision). 
 90 Id. at C4, col. 4. 
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had until March 31, 2000 to respond to the proposed revisions, 
which the BIS anticipated would be effective no sooner than 2001.91 
A revised version of the proposal was issued for comment in 
January 2001.92  This version adopted a three-pronged approach to 
capital adequacy for international banks that were qualified to use 
it: capital adequacy requirements (largely revised from the 1988 
guidelines);93  increased supervision of bank capital maintenance 
policies;94  and greater transparency through disclosure to the mar-
ket, with resulting market discipline.95  These elements were re-
ferred to as the three “pillars” of minimum capital requirements, the 
supervisory review process, and market discipline.96 
The revised proposal was highly criticized by banking industry 
commentators,97  mainly because of reporting requirements per-
ceived as excessive, and the level of capital charges viewed as un-
necessarily high.  In addition, in Spring 2001, the annual report of 
the BIS Committee on Banking Supervision, reviewing the public 
disclosure practices of international banks, criticized the relative 
lack of disclosure in areas related to credit risk modeling and use of 
internal and external ratings by major banks.98  This situation ad-
versely implicated the proposed revision of the capital accord, since 
disclosure of information with respect to use of internal ratings is 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 ACCORD, supra note 81. 
 93 See id. at 6–103 (discussing approaches to capital requirements). 
 94 See id. at 104–12 (discussing supervision). 
 95 See id. at 114–33 (discussing transparency and disclosure). 
 96 See Daniel Pruzin, Capital Accord Draft Completion Delayed as Basel Committee 
Eyes New Revisions, BLOOMBERG L. (June 26, 2001) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/8ZUS-QU6T]) (noting industry oppo-
sition). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Cites Mixed Results for Meeting Proposed Capi-
tal Accord, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 24, 2001) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/KRB5-HMT5]) [hereinafter Pruzin, 
Basel Committee Cites Mixed Results].  However, in a May 2002 report, the Basel Com-
mittee indicated that internationally active banks had modestly increased their public dis-
closure of such information during 2000. Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Cites ‘Modest’ 
Improvement in Information Disclosures, BLOOMBERG L. (May 16, 2002) (available by 
subscription at https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/HW2E-S6LV]). Never-
theless, it did caution that most banks still failed to provide such information with respect 
to the use of credit derivatives and other sophisticated instruments subject to reporting 
requirements under the proposed accord. Id. 
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necessary for banks to qualify for the internal ratings-based ap-
proach proposed in “Pillar I” of the new accord.99 
After much reconsideration, in April 2003, the Basel Committee 
asked for comment on its “Third Consultative Paper of the New Ba-
sel Capital Accord,” and indicated its intention to finalize in the near 
future a Basel II Accord that would be implemented in 2007.100  In 
August 2003, the British Bankers’ Association and the London In-
vestment Banking Association confirmed that they had requested a 
delay in Basel II until 2010 and expressed a desire that the Basel II 
rules be further revised to be “less prescriptive and more principles-
based.”101  Towards the end of that month, Standard & Poor’s 
(“S&P”) Rating Service announced that it might downgrade banks 
if it disagreed with methods the banks used under Basel II to calcu-
late capital requirements.102  Although S&P expressed support for 
the Basel II effort to improve bank sensitivity to risk and risk as-
sessment and measurement, “changes in the availability of credit 
arising from incentives created by the accord could have far-reach-
ing effects on bank funding, the continued development of interna-
tional capital markets, and the global economy.”103 
Following even more wrangling among policymakers of partic-
ipating states,104  in May 2004 the Committee announced that it had 
finally reached agreement on outstanding issues that had impeded 
the finalizing of the Basel II accord.105  The Committee stated that 
 
 99 Pruzin, Basel Committee Cites Mixed Results, supra note 98. 
 100 R. Christian Bruce, Regulators Must Supply More Answers Before Basel Can Be 
Adopted, Shelby, Sarbanes Say, BLOOMBERG L., (June 19, 2003) (available by subscription 
at https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/A2GN-RUBW]). 
 101 Patrick Tracey & Karen Werner, British Banking Groups Seek Delay in Basel II 
Capital Accord Until 2010, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 11, 2003) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/MWX6-QTW4]). 
 102 Richard Cowden, S&P Report Says It Might Downgrade Some Banks Under Basel 
II Rules, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 28, 2003) (available by subscription at https://www.bloom-
berglaw.com [https://perma.cc/DYJ4-EGWZ]). 
 103 Id. (quoting Barbara Ridpath, Managing Director and Chief Criteria Officer, 
Standard & Poor’s Europe). 
 104 See, e.g., Richard Cowden, Regulators, Lawmakers, Industry Cautious as Basel II 
Accord Staggers to Finish Line, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 26, 2004) (available by subscription 
at  https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/W6AW-4XSK]) (reporting on pref-
erence of U.S. banks, regulators, and lawmakers to delay Basel II implementation past 
2006); Bruce, supra note 100 (reporting on congressional dissatisfaction with Basel II de-
liberations). 
 105 These issues included calibration of minimum capital requirements, the proposed 
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it would adhere to the proposed year-end 2006 target date for banks 
to adopt the more basic “standardized” and “foundation IRB” ap-
proaches for assessing minimum capital charges.106  However, for 
banks adopting the most advanced IRB approaches—most, if not 
all, major internationally-active banks107—the Committee expected 
that a year-end 2007 target date was necessary to allow further im-
pact analysis and parallel running of old and revised standards be-
fore full implementation.108 
On June 26, 2004, the Committee approved the final version of 
the revised accord.109  The Committee emphasized that it would con-
tinue to review the calibration of the accord prior to its implemen-
tation and adjust it as necessary to ensure that the new capital rules 
did not result in a sharp increase in overall minimum capital require-
ments.110  As with the previous guidelines, the Committee expected 
that the revised accord would become the global standard for mini-
mum capital requirements.111  However, India and China, among 
other major developing countries, indicated that they did not intend 
to adopt the revised accord,112  and U.S. regulators—including the 
 
capital charge for operational risk, and the use of advanced internal ratings-based [IRB] 
systems for assessing bank capital charges.  Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Announces 
Deal on Key Remaining Accord Issues, BLOOMBERG L. (May 12, 2004) (available by sub-
scription at https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/A74D-3HMS]). 
 106 Id. Competitive effects may be exhibited even during the transition period. See 
Richard Cowden, Report Says Basel II Could Produce Significant Competitive Effects 
Soon, BLOOMBERG L. (July 16, 2004) (available by subscription at https://www.bloomber-
glaw.com [https://perma.cc/LEE6-6AJU]) (reporting on July 2004 report issued by Fed-
eral Financial Analytics, Inc., suggesting non-U.S. banks adopting basic form of the re-
vised capital standards, “standardized approach,” may experience immediate competitive 
advantage over short term). 
 107 See, e.g., Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. pt. 
225, App. A, § 1.b.(2) n.6 (2004) (defining an “internationally active banking organiza-
tion” as a banking organization that on a year-end basis had total consolidated assets of 
$250 billion or more or total on-balance-sheet foreign exposure of $10 billion or more). 
 108 Pruzin, supra note 105. 
 109 BCBS, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND 
CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004), https://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs107.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3WM-P9WR]. 
 110 Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Approves ‘Final’ Version of Capital Accord; Cri-
teria Could Still ‘Evolve’, BLOOMBERG L. (June 29, 2004) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/952W-YTG6]). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. However, in April 2006, the head of the China Banking Regulatory Commis-
sion (“CBRC”) stated that China would adopt Basel II standards within four to six years 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) as well as the bank-
ing regulators—decided that it would only be required for the 
twenty or so largest internationally active U.S. banks.113  Neverthe-
less, according to the Secretary-General of the Basel Committee, 
Basel II would still make financial markets healthier by giving ac-
countants, investors, and other interested parties more information 
on which to base critical decisions.114 
But implementation of Basel II encountered significant difficul-
ties.  In June 2005, George French, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”) Deputy Director for Policy and Examination 
Oversight, suggested that differences between U.S. and European 
procedures for bringing Basel II into effect could inhibit multilateral 
cooperation in the effort to revise global capital standards.115  There 
was also substantive concern whether implementation of Basel II, 
 
for domestic banks with substantial numbers of overseas branches. Kathleen E. McLaugh-
lin, CBRC Chair Says China Will Adopt Basel II Standards Starting in 2010, BLOOMBERG 
L. (Apr. 13, 2006) (available by subscription at https://www.bloomberglaw.com 
[https://perma.cc/CKQ3-73WJ]).  With the subsequent switch to Basel III arrangements, 
discussed infra, the CBRC director-general of policy research and statistics expressed sup-
port for Basel III as “an important step in terms of building a robust global financial archi-
tecture.’’ Joyce E. Cutler, Asian Countries Ready for Basel III, Want Consideration of 
Local Realities, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 12, 2011) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/2WPP-SY78]) (quoting CBRC direc-
tor-general Liu during Asian banking conference in San Francisco).  Reportedly, the 
CBRC currently is revising its regulations so Basel III implementation can begin by some 
time in 2012. Id. Likewise, in December 2011, the government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (“SAR”) announced that it would introduce Banking Bill 2011, an 
amendment to its Banking Ordinance to initiate the process of adopting the Basel III frame-
work. See Michael Standaert, Hong Kong to Amend Banking Ordinance to Implement Ba-
sel III Conventions, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 12, 2011) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/PH6B-7CSA]) (reporting on Hong 
Kong SAR proposed adoption of Basel III standards). 
 113 Five Federal Agencies Announce Plans to Implement Basel II over Four-Year Pe-
riod, BLOOMBERG L. (June 29, 2004) (available by subscription at https://www.bloomber-
glaw.com [https://perma.cc/4U7W-TUYN]). 
 114 Ryozo Himino, Basel II—Towards a New Common Language, BIS Q. REV. (Sept. 
6, 2004), http://www.bis.org/press/p040906.htm [https://perma.cc/WR85-TEFD]. As an 
example, Secretary-General Himino argued that Basel II will mean more transparency, 
allowing investors to know, for example, whether the bank’s assets are risk-free cash or 
high-risk securities. Id. 
 115 See R. Christian Bruce, FDIC Official Cites Basel II ‘Disconnect’ Between U.S., 
European Bank Regulators, BLOOMBERG L. (June 28, 2005) (available by subscription 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com  [https://perma.cc/G4VQ-BMQJ]) (reporting on France’s 
remarks). U.S. supervisors are using a regulatory process to implement Basel II, whereas 
European implementation is expected to be affected through legislative amendments. Id. 
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which would be fully applicable only for the largest U.S. interna-
tionally active banks,116  might result in significant capital reduc-
tions for those banks in the aggregate.117  This could stratify bank 
regulation between the largest U.S. banks and other financial insti-
tutions. 
Preparations for implementation of Basel II continued neverthe-
less.  The comment period for the proposed implementing rules 
ended on March 26, 2007.118  Although the agencies had agreed 
jointly to issue the September 2006 proposed rules for comment, 
clear differences among the FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Reserve System (“the Fed”), and 
the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) surfaced over what the fi-
nal version of the Basel II rules should look like.119  Finally, in July 
2007 the regulators announced that they had reached a compromise 
agreement on a final rule for U.S. implementation of Basel II in 
early 2008.120 
In December 2007, the four regulators jointly published final 
rules implementing Basel II for the largest, internationally active 
U.S. banks.121  The final rules were effective on April 1, 2008.122  
While U.S. banking institutions were expected to begin a prelimi-
nary phase of implementation early in 2008, compliance with Basel 
 
 116 Ten to fifteen U.S. banks are likely to be required to adopt Basel II, with perhaps 
another fifteen or so being permitted to move to the Basel II system. The vast majority of 
U.S. banks are expected to continue to operate subject to Basel I. Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Federal Reserve Working Quickly to Implement Basel 
II Final Rules, BLOOMBERG L. (May 22, 2007) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/K8KL-X8JP]). 
 119 See, e.g., id. (discussing Fed’s concerns that review of Basel II proposal was falling 
increasingly behind “in terms of industry practice, which continues to evolve;” suggesting 
that Basel II proposal was “a very dynamic process” subject to continuing revision). 
 120 R. Christian Bruce, Regulators Reach Agreement on Basel II, Clearing Path for 
2008 U.S. Implementation, BLOOMBERG L. (July 23, 2007) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/Y8NL-HPK2]). 
 121 Risk-Based Capital Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 3 (OCC rules), 208, 225 (Fed rules), 325 (FDIC rules), 559–560, 563, 567 (OTS 
rules)), corrected, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,471 (Aug. 29, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 3.121, 
3.202) (technical corrections). For simplicity, the final rule uses the term “bank” to include 
banks, savings associations, and bank holding companies (“BHCs”). Risk-Based Capital 
Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288 n.1 (Dec. 7, 2007). The terms “bank holding company” 
and BHC do not include savings and loan holding companies regulated by the OTS. Id. 
 122 Risk-Based Capital Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007). 
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II was not required until January 1, 2009, when the new standards 
would begin to be phased in over a three-year period.123  It was an-
ticipated that only twenty-five or so of U.S. banking institutions 
would be required to adopt Basel II, with another small group of 
relatively large U.S. banking institutions having the option to do the 
same.124  The overwhelming majority of U.S. banking institutions 
would be required either to continue to apply the 1988 Basel I stand-
ards, or to adopt the new and more risk-sensitive version of the orig-
inal standards, known as Basel IA.125 
Unfortunately, at this point the 2008 collapse of capital markets 
intervened.126  At least one reason that the current economic and fi-
nancial crisis became so severe was that the financial services sector 
in many countries accumulated excessive on- and off-balance sheet 
leverage, accompanied by a gradual erosion of the level and quality 
of their capital base.127  Despite the capital adequacy requirements, 
the international banking system was simply not capable of absorb-
ing the systemic losses that bled into it.128  In the aftermath of the 
crisis, the Basel Committee announced in July 2009 that it had 
agreed in principle to three significant sets of changes in the Basel 
II capital accord.129  First, Pillar 1 capital requirements would be 
significantly revised; the Committee would require a leverage ratio 
of core capital to assets as a backup measure to the Basel II capital-
 
 123 R. Christian Bruce, Fed’s Governors, Eyeing Credit Turmoil, Welcome New Cap-
ital Rules Under Basel II, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 5, 2007) (available by subscription at  
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/3ADC-YL5R]). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 On the origins of the 2008 crisis, see MALLOY, ANATOMY OF A MELTDOWN, supra 
note 37. 
 127 See, e.g., Frederic S. Mishkin, Member, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., 
Speech on “Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Meltdown” at the U.S. Mone-
tary Policy Forum, New York, New York (Feb. 29, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080229a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/A7TG-7K7K]) (discussing the role of leverage). 
 128 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: An International and Re-
gional Threat in Need of a Solution, in NEW CHALLENGES OF THE LAW IN A PERMEABLE 
WORLD 9 (David A. Frenkel & Carsten Gerner-Beuerle eds., 2009).   
 129 See Press Release, BCBS, Basel II Capital Framework Enhancements Announced 
by the Basel Committee (July 13, 2009), http://www.bis.org/press/p090713.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6VZV-F28N] (setting forth committee statements on revisions); see also 
Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Announces Changes to Supervisory Pillar of Capital Ac-
cord, BLOOMBERG L. (July 14, 2009) (available by subscription at https://www.bloomber-
glaw.com [https://perma.cc/7HWB-7F3N]). 
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assets ratio.130  In addition, banks would be expected to build up 
capital above the required ratio as a reserve against future systemic 
crises.131  Finally, banks would be required to improve the quality 
of capital maintained in these reserves, possibly by increasing the 
percentage of core capital required in the calculation of the capital 
to assets ratio.132  The actual calibration of the leverage ratio and of 
the systemic reserve was deferred until later in 2010.133  Banks 
would be expected to comply with the newly revised requirements 
by December 31, 2010, with Basel I capital requirements remaining 
in place in the interim.134  The Committee also introduced higher 
risk weights for securitization exposures such as collateralized debt 
obligations135  of asset-backed securities—subprime mortgage-re-
lated investments—to reflect the higher risk inherent in such prod-
ucts, and it raised the credit conversion factor for short-term liquid-
ity facilities with respect to off-balance sheet conduits.136 
Furthermore, the Committee planned to issue supplemental 
 
 130 Committee participants such as the United States, Canada, and Switzerland have 
already introduced such leverage ratios.  In the case of Switzerland, for example, the two 
largest banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, are required to maintain a minimum capital-core 
assets ratio of three percent for the consolidated group and four percent for the operating 
bank. Pruzin, supra note 129. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 There are some indications that the committee would use the Canadian leverage 
ratio as a model; it includes on-balance sheet assets as well as off-balance sheet assets 
(including derivatives) in the leverage ratio. Id. By August 2012, the Canadian Govern-
ment moved closer to reconciling its current Capital Adequacy Requirements Guidelines 
with the new Basel III reforms. Draft New Capital Adequacy Guideline Meets Basel III 
Standard, Canadian Regulator Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 10, 2012) (available by sub-
scription at https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/TW7G-S4JR]) (reporting 
on draft Canadian capital adequacy guidelines). 
 134 Pruzin, supra note 129. 
 135 In contrast, however, it now appears that new issuances of collateralized loan ob-
ligations (“CLOs”) are on the rise, although as yet these have not resulted in sustained 
market growth. Stephen Joyce, Revival of Collateralized Loan Obligation Market Seen 
Slowed by EU, U.S. Regulations, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 4, 2012) (available by subscription 
at  https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/7TAU-FP48]).  A CLO is a financial 
instrument that securitizes pieces of large corporate loans, through the medium of a special 
purpose vehicle, for sale to eligible investors. The CLO issuer creates different tranches of 
instruments, with senior tranches, typically rated AAA to BB and pricing based on the 
priority with which each receives payments of principal and interest from the pool of as-
sets. Before the financial crisis, CLOs were popular with investors, with new issuances in 
2007 reaching almost $95 billion. Id. 
 136 Pruzin, supra note 129. 
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guidance under Pillar 2 of Basel II, governing enhanced supervision 
of banks, to address the flaws in risk management revealed by the 
financial crisis.137  In particular, the supplemental guidance was ex-
pected to raise the standards for enterprise-wide governance and 
risk management of internationally active banks, to improve the 
identification of off-balance sheet risks and the management of risk 
concentrations within banks, and to provide incentives for banks to 
manage long-term risk and returns better.138  The Committee ex-
pected these changes to be implemented immediately.139 
Finally, Pillar 3, establishing disclosure requirements, would be 
revised to strengthen disclosure requirements for securitizations, 
off-balance sheet exposures and trading activities.140  Banks would 
have until December 31, 2010, to implement the revised Pillar 3 re-
quirements.141 
In December 2009, the Committee fleshed out the agreement in 
principle142  by issuing two proposals to further revise the Basel Ac-
cord to strengthen capital requirements143  and to improve risk man-
agement of liquidity.144  However, the Committee acknowledged 
that a fully calibrated set of revised standards would only be phased 
in over a period of years.145  Essentially, Basel II was losing 
 
 137 Joyce, supra note 135. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Pruzin, supra note 129. 
 142 BCBS, STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR 65 (2009), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf [https://perma.cc/LDJ5-U6ZR]; BCBS, INTERNA-
TIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS AND MONITORING 
5–19 (2009), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G7Q-3D9R].  For 
the U.S. Government position encouraging Basel II revisions for higher regulatory capital 
and liquidity standards by the end of 2010, see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 
Stronger Capital and Liquidity Standards for Banking Firms (Sept. 3, 2009), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg274.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
LWE5-FMD3]. See also R. Christian Bruce, Treasury Department Eyes Global Accord on 
Bank Regulatory Capital by End of 2010, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 4, 2009) (available by 
subscription at www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/V84F-GSLY]). 
 143 See BCBS, , BASEL III DEFINITION OF CAPITAL - FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
2–8 (2011), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d417.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9W3-M374] (dis-
cussing disclosure requirements). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Unveils Proposals for Strengthening Global Fi-
nancial System, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 18, 2009) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/4LBJ-4A9F]). 
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momentum.146 
B. Basel III 
In effect, the Committee was already headed towards a “Basel 
III” arrangement.147  The problem, however, was that the added cap-
ital costs of markedly stronger liquidity requirements could well be 
prohibitive for most banks.148  According to a December 2010 study 
by the Committee for European Banking Supervisors,149  large, in-
ternationally active EU-based banks would have difficulty comply-
ing with the proposed Basel III Tier 1 capital ratio of seven per-
cent.150  Assuming full implementation of the final Basel III require-
ments, based on data as of year-end 2009, 
[t]he Tier 1 capital ratios of Group 1 banks [i.e., banks with Tier 
1 capital in excess of € 3 billion] would on average decline from 
10.3% to 5.6%, while total capital ratios would decrease from 
14.0% to 8.1%. The reduction in other capital ratios is also less 
pronounced for Group 2 banks [i.e., all other banks]. Tier 1 capital 
ratios would decrease from 10.3% to 7.6% and total capital ratios 
 
 146 See Daniel Pruzin, Basel Committee Cites Continued Progress on Implementation 
of Basel Capital Rules, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 28, 2013) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com  [https://perma.cc/6KAC-2E64]) (discussing Basel com-
mittee report on implementation of capital rules).  However, as of August 2013, 22 Basel 
Committee member states had fully implemented the so-called Basel 2.5, the 2009 agree-
ment to enhance the measurement of risks related to securitization and trading book expo-
sures, while Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and the United States had either par-
tially adopted or were at the proposal stage with respect to Basel 2.5.  Id. 
 147 Cf. MALLOY, supra note 5, § 7.03[C][4][b] (discussing extensive proposed revi-
sions to Basel II). See generally Gregory J. Lyons & Chan E. Casey, Basel III–An Initial 
Piece of the Global Puzzle, 5 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON FIN. INSTS.  REP. 8 (2011) (discussing 
Basel III arrangements). 
 148 See Daniel Pruzin, Research Group Says Banks Would ‘Struggle’ to Meet Liquid-
ity Standards of Basel III Draft, BLOOMBERG L. (May 10, 2010) (available by subscription 
at https://www.bloomberglaw.com  [https://perma.cc/858Y-FKDH]) (reporting on ana-
lysts’ concerns about consequences of “Basel III” liquidity proposals). 
 149 COMM. OF EUR. BANKING SUPERVISORS, RESULTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE QUAN-
TITATIVE IMPACT STUDY  3 (2010), https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/doc-
uments/10180/16151/52fc33da-4a4d-422a-858b-fa29a896182d/EU-QIS-report-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DSF8-EF8Z]. 
 150 In September 2012, the European Banking Authority reported that among the 44 
largest EU banks there was still a capital shortfall totaling $256 billion as measured against 
a 7 percent core tier one capital standard. Joe Kirwin, EU Banks Face Basel III Shortfall 
of $256 Billion, Bank Authority Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 28, 2012) (available by sub-
scription at https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/C5WU-RXPT]). 
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would decline from 13.1% to 10.3%.151 
Furthermore, in light of the fact that the U.S. regulators never 
fully implemented Basel II, the very real possibility that they might 
abandon Basel III, in whole or in part, continued to be a source of 
serious concern among European regulators in particular.152  In con-
trast, implementation of Basel III has come to be viewed as a critical 
component of economic and fiscal recovery within Europe,153  and 
especially within the Euro Zone.154  The European Union has con-
tinued to move forward with implementation of Basel III.155  In 
 
 151 COMM. OF EUR. BANKING SUPERVISORS, supra note 149, at 3. 
 152 See, e.g., Aaron Lorenzo, European Officials Worry U.S. Regulators Might Not 
Heed New Basel Standards, BLOOMBERG L. (Jun. 9, 2010) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/Q5W4-4ZUF]) (reporting on European 
concerns over possible failure of capital harmonization efforts). 
 153 Cf. Jeffery Atik, EU Implementation of Basel III in the Shadow of Euro Crisis, 33 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 283, 328–30 (2013) (demonstrating that European sovereign debt 
crisis, not the 2007-2008 financial meltdown, is the focus of recent EU regulatory policy, 
with resulting attenuation of strict conformity to Basel III). 
 154 See Steven T. Voigt, The General Welfare Clause: An Exploration of Original 
Intent and Constitutional Limits Pertaining to the Rapidly Expanding Federal Budget, 43 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 543, 561 n.75 (2010). 
The euro-zone [sic] is a currency union of 16 European states [17, since 1 January 
2011] which have adopted the euro as their sole legal tender. The eurozone [sic] 
currently consists of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, [since 1 January 2011, Estonia,] 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Neth-
erlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. 
Id.  Latvia, whose austerity program appears to have been a success, was approved in June 
2013 to become the 18th member of the Euro Zone in 2014. See Joe Kirwin, Latvia Wel-
comed into Eurozone, Hailed as Rare Austerity Success Story, BLOOMBERG L. (June 6, 
2013) (available by subscription at https://www.bloomberglaw.com 
[https://perma.cc/P2RW-D9KU]).  More generically, the Euro itself, “is also used in An-
dorra, Monaco, San Marino, the Vatican and some French overseas territories.” Michael 
P. Malloy, Negotiating in a Ditch: Institutional Implications of the Sovereign Debt Crisis, 
28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 n.1 (2012).  It is also the official currency in Montenegro and 
Kosovo. Id. A December 2010 OECD report on the Euro Zone recommended that EU 
economic authorities should speed up implementation of the Basel III capital accord as 
well as enhancing financial supervision, especially in the area of risk diversification. See 
generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (“OECD”), OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: 
EURO AREA 2010 (2010), available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-eco-
nomic-surveys-euro-area-2010_eco_ 
surveys-euz-2010-en [https://perma.cc/3E7H-Y8P4]; Rick Mitchell, OECD Study Says 
EU Should Consider Faster Implementation of Basel III Rules, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 14, 
2010)  (available by subscription at https://www.bloomberglaw.com  
[https://perma.cc/F2BNJXSQ]) (reporting on OECD recommendations). 
 155 However, the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis dramatically affected other EU 
initiatives. See, e.g., Diana Gregg, Banking Union Some Way off, Almunia Tells 
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October 2010, the European Commission initiated a consultation 
process156  for new rules requiring financial institutions to build 
“countercyclical” capital buffers during times of robust economic 
growth.  In accordance with Basel III, the new rules contemplated 
higher capital requirements during high-growth periods and lower 
capital requirements during economic downturns.157 
The Committee issued a final version of the new Basel III capi-
tal rules on December 16, 2010.158  When fully effective, the new 
rules would require internationally active banks to increase the 
amount of high-quality, low-risk capital in the form of common eq-
uity more than three-fold, from a current minimum level of 2 per-
cent of risk-weighted assets to 4.5 percent by 2015, with an addi-
tional 2.5 percent “capital conservation buffer” to be phased in by 
January 2019.159  Overall minimum Tier 1 capital (i.e., common eq-
uity and qualifying low-risk financial instruments) would increase 
from a present minimum of 4 percent to 4.5 percent by January 2013 
and 6 percent by 2015.160 
Recovery from the 2008 collapse remains elusive and incom-
plete, and this uncertainty has impeded confidence and consensus 
in Basel III.161  In March 2016, the Basel Committee proposed to 
 
Washington Think-Tank, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 26, 2013) (available by subscription at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/5WLV-UDQY]) (discussing remarks 
by EU vice president and commissioner for competition concerning delays in bank regu-
latory integration as result of financial crisis). 
 156 Consultation on Countercyclical Buffers, EUR. COMM’N ON BANKING & FIN., 
https://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2010/capital-buffer/index_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9BUS-6VDS]; see Joe Kirwin, EC Begins Adoption of Basel Standards 
for Bank Countercyclical Capital Buffers, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 25, 2010) (available by 
subscription at https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/Q6QE-E3S4]) (report-
ing on consultation with respect to countercyclical capital buffers). 
 157 Kirwin, supra note 156. 
 158 See BCBS, BASEL III: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK MEAS-
UREMENT, STANDARDS AND MONITORING 3 (2010), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZU7N-N4AE] (providing “rules text” of macro and microprudential 
standards); see also Daniel Pruzin, Basel Panel Issues Final ‘Basel III’ Package; Version 
Contains New Liquidity Rule Details, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 17, 2010) (available by sub-
scription at https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/URT7-Y4LZ]) (reporting 
on issuance of package of releases). For a useful discussion of the LCR, see Andrew W. 
Hartlage, The Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Financial Stability, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 453, 462–70 (2012). 
 159 Pruzin, supra note 158. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Cf., e.g., BANK OF ENG., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 52 (2008), 
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remove the option for banks to use their own IRB models to deter-
mine their capital assets ratio,162  which would force them to use a 
standardized method set by their respective regulators.  The pro-
posal was intended to simplify the capital adequacy rubric and to 
reduce wide variations in supervisory results.163  The plan also en-
visioned a floor to limit how far risk assessments using the models 
that would still be allowed—for assets such as mortgages and small-
business loans—can diverge from those obtained with the standard-
ized approach.164  Thus, difficulties that emerged over post-crisis 
capital rules set stricter standards for how lenders estimate the risk-
iness of their assets, dubbed by the global banking industry as “Ba-
sel IV.”165  Estimates suggest that the new accounting framework 
could reduce the common equity Tier 1 ratio for some lenders by 
3.9 percentage points, to 9.5 percent in the aggregate.166 
C. The Role of Capital as a Regulatory Tool 
One fundamental question remains unresolved: why use capital 
as the basic measuring tool of safety and soundness in banking su-
pervision?  In traditional corporate law terms, capital serves at least 
four distinct roles.  First, capital is the source of the primary (or, at 
least, the most significant) operational financial resources for the 
corporate enterprise.167   Second, it is the marker for the competing 
property interests in the enterprise, indicating the ultimate (i.e., liq-
uidational) property rights of various classes of investors.168  Third, 




[https://perma.cc/K6N3-8XT9] (calling for “fundamental overhaul” of standards for sys-
temic risk). 
 162 Silla Brush & John Glover, Banks’ Leeway on Credit Risk Narrows as Basel Tight-
ens Rules, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 25, 2016) (available by subscription at www.bloomber-
glaw.com  [https://perma.cc/FJF2-V74T]). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991), https://catalog.ha-
thitrust.org/Record/002480222 [https://perma.cc/9K8Z-XXZJ], reprinted in FED. BANK-
ING L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 88,367 (Feb. 5, 1991) (discussing roles of capital in operation of a 
bank). 
 168 Cf., e.g., 8 Del. Code Ann. § 151(a) (2020) (providing for rights of stockholders). 
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indicating, for example, the relative voting rights of different classes 
of investors.169   Fourth, capital is the primary measure or precondi-
tion of insolvency.170 
The problem is that banking enterprises tend to be atypical and 
asymmetrical with respect to the corporate roles of capital.171  This 
is particularly true of the first and fourth roles of capital identified 
above.  On the other hand, in sharp contrast with the pattern found 
in most modern general business corporation statutes, banking stat-
utes add an additional role for capital—that of gatekeeper into the 
industry.172  In this sense, minimum capital requirements and rules 
about continuing capital maintenance, long abandoned as formal re-
quirements for incorporation under general business corporation 
statutes, continue to hold sway in the regulated industry of bank-
ing.173  This fifth role may help to explain why in both national bank-
ing statutes and in the BIS guidelines and proposed accord, capital 
is treated as a central focus of supervisory policy.174  Is this emphasis 
warranted as a matter of fact? 
Early in the last century, in Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Pottorff,175  
Justice Brandeis observed: “The amount of the deposits is com-
monly accepted as a measure of the bank’s success; and increase of 
deposits as evidence of increased prosperity.”176  Thus, banks are 
exceptionally adept at using other people’s money, rather than their 
own capital, as the primary source of operational resources.  It is the 
bank deposit, a form of debt arrangement, that generates the primary 
 
 169 See, e.g., id. § 212(a) (providing rules with respect to voting rights of stockhold-
ers). 
 170 Cf. Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. 
Ch. 2004) (holding that for purposes of receivership action, creditor sufficiently pled that 
corporation was insolvent). 
 171 See MALLOY, supra note 7, at 312 (noting that “[e]ven banks that fully comply 
with capital requirements are still highly leveraged, far beyond the levels of viable general 
business corporations”). 
 172 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(f)(2)(i)(C) (2020) (for national bank charter, requiring 
“capital that is sufficient to support the projected volume and type of business”). 
 173 Compare, e.g., 8 Del. Code Ann. § 102 (omitting any requirement of minimum 
capital as condition of incorporation), with 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(f)(2)(i)(C) (requiring suffi-
cient capital for national bank charter). 
 174 See MALLOY, supra note 7, at 282 (noting increased attention of regulators to cap-
ital supervision). 
 175 Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245 (1934), amended sub nom. Tex. & Pac. 
Ry. v. First Nat’l Bank of El Paso, 291 U.S. 649 (1934). 
 176 Pottorff, 291 U.S. at 259. 
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bank assets—loans, investments and the like—and not a bank’s cap-
ital.177  In fact, banks are among the most highly leveraged of com-
mercial enterprises.178 
Of course, it may be argued that supervisory attention to capital 
requirements imposes market discipline on banks, and that this dis-
cipline will significantly supplement safety and soundness in bank-
ing.179  This argument remains largely undemonstrated in empirical 
terms.180  Given the highly leveraged condition of banks, it is likely 
that the market would in most instances exercise relatively trivial 
disciplinary pressure.181  Furthermore, the capital market is the 
wrong market exercising the discipline; depositors, the major “in-
vestors” in these enterprises, tend to refrain from exercising disci-
pline until it is too late.182 
 
 177 MALLOY, supra note 2, at 4. 
 178 MALLOY, supra note 7, at 312. 
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The assessment of the expected returned and potential investment risk by prospective or 
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offered (thus increasing the cost of relatively risky activities), or by decreasing the poten-
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ical matter, depositors do not generally contract with depository institutions with the mind-
set or motivations of investors—nor is it clear that they should.  See generally Helen A. 
Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. 
REG. 129 (1986) (arguing that market discipline approach to bank regulation is unlikely to 
work in practice, given behavior of depositors); Garten, supra note 180 (criticizing market 
discipline arguments of Macey & Garrett).  See also Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing 
Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 
501, 558–64 (1989) [hereinafter Garten, Growing Pains] (discussing increased attention 
to “market discipline” approach to bank regulation).  Second, public disclosure is already 
one instrument of regulation, and its proper role is open to question.  See generally Michael 
P. Malloy, Public Disclosure as a Tool of Federal Bank Regulation, 9 ANN. REV. BANKING 
L. 229 (1990) (discussing and criticizing current uses of public disclosure in bank regula-
tion).  Indeed, the use of public disclosure in banking regulation has created additional 
ambiguity in the regulatory system, because the system is still essentially committed to a 
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Capital requirements might serve as a “tripwire” to alert bank 
and regulator alike to serious problems in a bank’s operations.  This 
argument similarly remains undemonstrated as an empirical mat-
ter.183  Even if true, this is at most a post hoc alarm system, particu-
larly when speaking of operational risk.  Conceivably, additional 
market-sensitive tripwires would make more sense, possibly the 
oversight of market performance of subordinated debt—another 
major component of a bank’s capital structure.  However, the vola-
tility of that market may make the tripwire very accurate but un-
timely. 
III.  Implications for International Law 
A. General Sources of International Law 
It is a commonplace notion that binding legal principles in pub-
lic international law derive from a specific range of recognized 
sources.184  The classic source is customary principles, derived from 
the common practice of states undertaken because of the perceived 
binding nature of the practice (opinio juris).185  The second source 
is treaty law, legal principles derived from conventional practice.186  
A third, more elusive source is the body of general principles of law 
recognized by civilized states.187  A fourth and final source, much 
beloved of academics, consists of the writings of recognized publi-
cists.188  It would be very difficult to find a place for the issuances 
and undertakings of the BIS in this array of sources. 
 
confidential approach to supervision and enforcement.  See, e.g., Alfred Dennis Mathew-
son, From Confidential Supervision to Market Discipline: The Role of Disclosure in the 
Regulation of Commercial Banks, 11 J. CORP.  L. 139, 146–50 (1986) (discussing devel-
opment of “confidential supervision” as basic principle of federal bank regulation). 
 183 Cf. Garten, Growing Pains, supra note 182 at 550–51, 558–64 (noting disconnect 
between regulators’ efforts and bank managers and shareholders responses). 
 184 See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1, Apr. 8, 1946, 33 
U.S.T. 993 (identifying sources of law). 
 185 For a useful example of the establishment of a principle of customary international 
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B. The Legal Character of BIS Issuances 
The BIS itself has consistently taken the position that the issu-
ances of the Basel Committee are not sources of law.189  Thus, it 
states on its website: 
The Basel Committee’s approach to policy development relies on 
the coordinated work of its various working groups and task 
forces, a wide and open consultation process, and cooperation 
with international institutions. The Committee also strives to re-
view the implementation of its standards in order to contribute to 
a level playing field among internationally active banks . . . . 
. . . Since the Committee does not possess any formal suprana-
tional authority, its decisions do not have legal force. The Com-
mittee, however, expects its members to implement standards in 
a full, timely and consistent manner.190 
This position is reflected in the specific language of BIS issu-
ances, particularly and most emphatically in the Basel Concordat.  
The Concordat is not, by its own terms, a binding international 
treaty or agreement; it is at best a statement of principles.191  The 
Concordat purports to set forth the optimal operating principles en-
dorsed by the members of the Committee.192  Post-Concordat issu-
ances of the BIS with respect to supervision of multinational bank-
ing enterprises, such as the April 1990 Supplement to the Concordat 
or the June 1992 Report On Minimum Standards, do not affect the 
character or basic framework established of the Concordat in this 
regard.193 
While the principles identified in the 1992 Report are consid-
ered “standards,” they are not, on their own explicit terms, binding 
on states.194  Nevertheless, the Report also makes it clear that BIS 
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participating states are expected to implement the standards, and 
other states are encouraged to do so—the fourth “standard” seems 
to establish a right in participating states to exclude banking enter-
prises from states that do not endorse the standards.195  Indeed, in 
U.S. practice the fourth standard has been implemented as a statu-
tory expectation and requirement; a non-U.S.-based banking enter-
prise applying for entry will be subject to comprehensive supervi-
sion by its home state as a condition of entry into the U.S. market.196 
While the BIS has been consistently careful to refrain from as-
serting source-of-law status for the issuances of the Basel Commit-
tee, products like the 1988 Capital Accord I do not express them-
selves in mere precatory language, but in prescriptive terms.  More 
importantly, states have endorsed the specific principles of the Ac-
cord as legally binding features of their national regulatory systems, 
and the states—and affected private sectors—have treated the fur-
ther development of the Accord as legally significant.197  One might 
argue that the administrative process of rule-creation performed by 
the Basel Committee is itself an emerging source of international 
regulatory law, intended to be implemented and enforced by adop-
tion in individual national regulatory systems.  It remains, then, to 
examine the behavior of states and other interested parties in this 
regard. 
C. Behavior of States 
Recognition of the untraditional character of this process of 
rule-creation should not be blunted by a narrow allegiance to tradi-
tional categories of sources of law under public international law.  
Contemporary behavior of states with respect to bank regulatory 
 
the Concordat] have been reformulated as minimum standards . . . which G-10 supervisory 
authorities expect each other to observe.”). 
 195 Id. (Standard 4 states “If a host country authority determines that any one of the 
foregoing minimum standards is not met to its satisfaction, that authority could impose 
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 197 Cf., e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. A, n.2 (“The risk-based capital measure [promul-
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rules and practices suggests that certain issuances of the Basel Com-
mittee in fact are accorded source-of-law recognition.198  As the BIS 
itself has acknowledged, “[i]n many cases, supervisory authorities 
in non-G-10 countries have seen fit publicly to associate themselves 
with the Committee’s initiatives.”199  The 1988 Capital Accord is 
currently used by regulators in over 100 countries to determine min-
imum capital reserves of banks subject to their supervision.200 
Since U.S. law applies the 1988 Capital Accord to all depository 
institutions, adoption of the subsequent revisions to the Accord 
could pose particularly difficult regulatory issues concerning dis-
parate treatment.201  It has been estimated that the ten largest U.S. 
banks would adopt the more flexible IRB approach to capital ade-
quacy, with perhaps the next largest ten to twenty banks also per-
mitted to do so.202  The remaining thousands of depository institu-
tions would continue to be subject to the more restrictive regime of 
the 1988 Capital Accord.203  Members of the Senate Banking Com-
mittee have raised critical questions about this dichotomy in treat-
ment under Basel II.204  For example, would lower capital costs for 
the largest twenty to thirty U.S. banks create an unjustifiable com-
petitive disadvantage for large regional banks and smaller “commu-
nity” banks?  Could this situation result in a renewed wave of ac-
quisitions, eliminating smaller banks that service local communi-
ties?  Furthermore, competitive issues aside, do the revisions to the 
Accord give too much discretion to the largest banks to formulate 
the specific capital requirements that will apply to them? 
IV. Conclusion 
While it is true that the Basel Committee possesses no “formal 
supranational supervisory authority,”205  that observation seems to 
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beg the question that the contemporary practice of the committee 
seems to represent the emergence of a new kind of source of law. 
The activities of the Basel Committee result in concrete rules of law 
that represent an international administrative practice involving rule 
proposal for public comment, revision in light of public comments, 
and adoption, implementation, and enforcement at the national 
level. 
